The voting rules of the European Council (EU) under the Treaty
Introduction
The voting rules used in the European Council (EU) under the Treaty of Lisbon (which became effective on 1 November 2014) is quite unique within the current, global range of electoral systems. It not only requires a "qualified majority" of both the number of member states supporting a proposal and the population of the supporting member states, but also specifies a "blocking minority" which can block a proposal if certain condition is satisfied. It is the existence of such a "blocking minority" that makes the system complicated and interesting to study from the mathematical point of view. In fact, showed that this voting system has dimension between 7 and 13368 and therefore this dimension sets a world record of the dimension of the real-world voting bodies. Indeed, the previous record holders are EU under Treaty of Nice and the Legislative Council of Hong Kong and both of them have dimension 3 (see Freixas (2004) and Cheung & Ng (2014) ).
In this article, we will reduce Kurz & Napel's upper bound to 25 or even 24 (depending on the populations of the countries in EU). This is achieved by finding a new way to represent the union of two weighted games as an intersection of certain weighted games (Theorem 1). It is expected that Theorem 1 will be useful for computing the dimension of other real world voting systems. Finally, assuming that the United Kingdom is no longer a member of the European Union Council, we will show that our upper bound will jump to 1362 while Kurz & Napel's lower bound will only increase to 8.
Notations and definitions
Definition 2.1. A simple game is a pair (N, v) where N is the set of players described as {1, . . . , n} and v is the characteristic function which satisfies:
A coalition S is winning if v(S) = 1 and losing if v(S) = 0 and we let W(v)
be the set of winning coalitions of v. 
Data sets and the voting rule
Let us first state the rule of the voting game v EU of the EU systems: We numbered the 28 EU members by 1, . . . , 28 (see Table 1 or 2). A motion will be passed if Therefore v EU = v 16 ∧ (v 65 ∨ v 25 ) and hence the boolean dimension of v EU is 3 (see [3] ). Note that we also have
To compute the dimension of v EU , we need to know the populations of the 28 EU members. Here we will use four data sets. The 2014 data (Table 1) is from [3] , it will provide a clear comparison between their estimation and ours. The 2016 The , 2017 The , 2018 (Table   2 ,3,4) are taken from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat on 7 March, 2019. Indeed, according to Kurl & Napel (2015) , their data set was also taken from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat, but it seems the website had adjusted the data afterward. Note that the orders of the countries are not the same in the four tables, as we arranged the countries in descending populations, which will make it easier to study the voting game mathematically.
Realization of games as intersection of weighted games
In this section, we explain two constructions which are useful to realize a game as intersections of weighted games. Therefore, we have
and hence
Note that if we set v ′ = [1; 1, . . . Suppose that T = ∅. Then for each k ∈ T , we define
Note that if S is winning in v A , then it is winning in v k for each k ∈ T . Now suppose S is winning in v B but not winning in v A . In this case, S ∈ D by the definition of D and hence for each k ∈ T , we have k ∈ S and w
v ′ = k∈T v k and apply the construction I, we have
Note that this method may not yield good results when T is not big, as we will see in the next section.
We conclude this section by stating the result we just obtained.
Theorem 1.
Let v A and v B be two weighted games with the same set of players. Then
5 Upper bound of the dimension of the EU system.
Recall that v EU = v 16 ∧ (v 65 ∨ v 25 ). Hence the dimension of v EU is 1 plus the dimension of v 65 ∨v 25 . In this section, we will obtain a two digit upper bound on the dimension of v 65 ∨ v 25 based on the populations of the EU members in 2014,2016-18 given in Table 1 -4 respectively.
2014 data
Let v A = v 65 and v B = v 25 . For any S ⊂ N, define S c = N\S. Using the populations given in Table 1 , one can check that
Hence u = q A − (w 4 + · · · + w 28 ) = 33349058, T = {7, 8, . . . , 28} and 2, 7, 8, . . . , 28}}.
Apply Theorem 1 to v 65 ∨v 25 so that v EU = v 16 ∧(v 65 ∨v 25 ) can be realized as the intersection of the following 24 weighted games: 
Therefore, the dimension of v EU in 2014 is at most 24.
A remark
If we take v A = v 25 and v B = v 65 using 2014 data, then D contains {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, {3, 4, . . . , 26}, {1, 2, 6, 7, . . . , 26}, {1, 2, 3, 7, . . . , 27} and hence T = ∅ and our method produces no good upper bound.
2016 data
We take v A = v 65 and v B = v 25 for the 2016 data set. Just like the 2014 data set, we have 
Therefore, the dimension of v EU in 2016 is at most 25.
2017 data
For this case, D = {{1, 2, 3} c , {1, 2, 4} c , {1, 2, 5} c , {1, 2, 6} c , {1, 3, 4} c , {1, 3, 5} c ,
As a result, v EU can be again realized as the intersection of 25 weighted games as in the case for the 2016 data set.
2018 data
In this case, everything is identical to that of the 2017 data set, except u = 36226115. Therefore, the dimension of v EU in 2018 is again at most 25.
2018 data without UK
The United Kingdom has been seriously considering the possibility of leaving the EU during the preparation of this paper. Therefore, it would be
interesting to see what happens to our upper bound if UK is no longer a member of the EU. Using the 2018 data set without UK, we found that T = {16, 17, . . . , 28} and |F | = 1348. Hence, the upper bound of the dimension of v EU then jumps to 1362.
Also, we would like to point out that Kurz & Napel lower bound of v EU will also change with the absence of UK. Using the similar method introduced in section 5 of the paper by , we find the following set of losing coalitions with the 'pairwise incompatibility property' (see Kurz & 
